Courts and Tribunals Observers’ Network

Note on content: Both this blog and the external links contain discussion of violent and sexual offences, self-harm, and suicide. This may be distressing to some people. If you want support, you can contact the Samaritans on 116 123 or via their online chat. 

Note on reporting restrictions: It is strictly prohibited to identify a defendant under the age of 18 whose identity is protected by court order. Any person doing so may be in contempt of court, which is punishable by up to two years in prison. The comments on this blog have accordingly been disabled. 

On 22 October 2025, at Sheffield Crown Court, Mrs Justice Ellenbogen will sentence the killer of the teenager Harvey Willgoose.

Harvey Willgoose was 15 when he was stabbed at All Saints Catholic High School in Sheffield. On 8 August 2025 his killer, who is also 15 and currently cannot be identified, was found guilty of murder. 

In October, the judge will also consider an application by the press, which is supported by Harvey Willgoose’s parents, to name the defendant. The Star has set out their reasons for making such an application. 

This blog takes no position on what decision Ellenbogen J should reach, though it does consider general arguments against naming defendants under the age of 18. 

Instead, this blog will explain the legal and practical issues that a judge must consider when faced with an application to name a defendant under the age of 18.

The law

Anonymity is the general starting point once a person under the age of 18 is charged with a crime in the Youth Court. This is an automatic right where proceedings are heard in the Youth Court or on appeal from the Youth Court. However, the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 grants some exceptions. 

§49(5) permits the dispensation of anonymity where ‘it is appropriate to do so for the purpose of avoiding injustice to the child’ or where the anonymity is being given to ‘a child or young person […] who is unlawfully at large [and] it is necessary to dispense with those [anonymity] requirements for the purpose of apprehending him and bringing him before a court or returning him to the place in which he was in custody’.

§49(6) of the 1933 Act specifies the types of offences to which 49(5) applies. These are where the young person has been charged with, or convicted of: a violent offence, a sexual offence, a terrorism offence, an offence under the National Security Act 2023, or an offence where a person aged 21 or over could be punished with imprisonment of fourteen years or more. 

The 1933 Act does not give the court power to impose anonymity orders in the Crown Court, which is where the Harvey Willgoose case is being heard. That power comes from the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 

That is not to say that the court always gets it right, with erroneous reference made to restrictions under the 1933 Act even when proceedings are heard in the Crown Court.

§45(3) of the 1999 Act says – 

This means two things. First, a §45 order is discretionary and not automatic. If a Crown Court judge makes such an order it is prohibited to publish any information that identifies, or is likely to identify, a person who is under the age of 18 and involved in criminal proceedings. 

Second, this anonymity will only apply until the person is 18. In exceptional cases, that anonymity (or a variation of it) can be extended. 

In the event that a judge has made such an order, §45(4) of the 1999 Act grants the court the power to make “an excepting direction”, which would dispense with anonymity restrictions ‘if it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so’. Alternatively, an excepting direction may be granted if the effect of the reporting restriction imposes ‘a substantial and unreasonable restriction on the reporting of the proceedings (§45(5)(a)) or ‘it is in the public interest to remove or relax that restriction’ (§45(5)(b)). 

While an excepting direction may dispense with all reporting restrictions, that need not be the case. For example, the judge hearing the Harvey Willgoose case permitted the media to report that the defendant was a fellow pupil at the school because this would otherwise have been a significant and unreasonable restriction on reporting. 

When considering whether to grant an excepting direction, the court ‘shall have regard to the welfare of that person’ (§45(6)).

In the case of R v (1) BGI and (2) CMB, Mrs Justice Tipples DBE clearly sets out six points that the court must consider when faced with an application for an excepting direction.

1) The guidance in the Youth Defendants in the Crown Court (now Child Defendants in the Crown Court) and Reporting Restrictions in the Criminal Courts.

Chapter 11 of the Child Defendants in the Crown Court provides guidance on reporting restrictions. 

Both sets of guidance emphasise that there is an automatic right to anonymity for an underage defendant in the Youth Courts. They also emphasise that a judge of the Crown Court or the Youth Court can dispense with anonymity if it is in the public interest to do so. 

2)  ‘The power to protect the identity of persons under the age of 18 is consistent with the principles that inform the sentencing of children and young persons’. 

The guidance in Child Defendants in the Crown Court says this – 

Any Crown Court dealing with a defendant under the age of 18 must have regard to two parallel and fundamental principles:

(1) the principal aim of the youth justice system – to prevent offending (or re-offending) by persons aged under 18; and

(2) the welfare of the child.

3)  The balancing exercise ‘may shift at different stages in the proceedings’ 

For example, following sentence there may be greater weight in the interests of the public knowing the identity of the perpetrator than the perpetrator’s anonymity. Tipples J cites R v Winchester Crown Court (explained in a blog by Andrew Wheelhouse for the Oxford Human Rights Hub [hyperlinked]) . A judge must also keep in mind that the aim of the youth justice system is to prevent offending, and that the lifting of anonymity may be detrimental to a young defendant’s rehabilitation.

4) It is for the defendants to demonstrate why their anonymity should be preserved. 

This rests on the fact that the open justice principle is of such overriding importance that derogations to it must be fully justified by the person who seeks the derogation. In other words, the starting point is open justice. 

Tipples J cites (Marandi) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court (British Broadcasting Corporation and others intervening). 

5) As any reporting restriction made pursuant to the 1999 Act has effect only until the defendant reaches 18, the length of time before the defendant reaches that age is a relevant factor. 

This was an important element in Mrs Justice Yip’s consideration of whether to lift anonymity orders in respect of two teenagers who murdered Brianna Ghey. 

Scarlett Jenkinson and Eddie Ratcliffe were 15 at the time they murdered Brianna Ghey, and were 16 at the time Yip J was considering the press’s application to name them. She acknowledges that both defendants would turn 18 in 2025 and, therefore, the reporting restrictions would no longer apply:

I recognise that interest in this case is at its highest now and that this will abate to some extent in the coming weeks and months. That counts both ways in the balancing exercise I must perform. On the one hand, viewed from the defendants’ perspective the reporting and commentary is likely to be somewhat less fervent by 2025. Their identification at that time might therefore have less of an impact for them. On the other hand, the public interest in the identities of the defendants is at its highest now, around the time of their conviction and sentence. The press accordingly have a strong interest in being allowed to report fully, including identifying the defendants, now rather than in 2025. (§13)

[…]

The question for me is whether I should lift the reporting restrictions now or allow them to continue until they lapse by operation of law during 2025. I consider that, there is a strong public interest in full and unrestricted reporting of what is plainly an exceptional case, at the time the proceedings are being concluded. Continuing the reporting restrictions until the defendants turn 18 would, in my view, represent a substantial and unreasonable restriction on the freedom of the press. (§20)

The fact that a defendant will reach 18 while still imprisoned was an important factor in the case of Lucas Markham and Kim Edwards who jointly killed the mother and younger sister of Kim Edwards.  The Court of Appeal found that,

there is no evidence before us that reporting their identities would adversely affect the future rehabilitation of the appellants, and, thus, be contrary to the welfare of a child, which would give rise to a weighty consideration in the balancing of competing considerations in the assessment that we must make. The reality is that anonymity lasts only until 18 years of age and both appellants face a very considerable term of detention that will stretch long into their adult life. The process of reflecting on their dreadful crimes, addressing their offending behaviour, and starting a process of rehabilitation will be a lengthy one. (§89)

In other cases, the court has taken the view that identifying defendants under the age of 18 would jeopardise their rehabilitation. Shawn Seesahi was 19 years old when he was killed by two 12-year-old boys. Three media organisations, supported by Shawn Seesahi’s family, sought to be able to identify the defendants. Their counsel, Jude Bunting KC, submitted that knife crime “is an issue of substantial public interest”, and naming the defendants would enable the media to investigate potential institutional failings. 

The judge declined the application, finding that identifying the defendants would have a detrimental impact on their welfare. In addition, the court heard extensive evidence about the vulnerability of the defendants, which included evidence of grooming and criminal exploitation. All of this weighed against the public’s need to know the identity of the defendants. 

6) An application for a continuing injunction can be made in anticipation of the person reaching 18. 

One of the most well-known cases of an injunction that continues to protect the identity of child offenders is the case of Jon Venables and Robert Thompson who, at the age of ten and a half, murdered the two-year-old James Bulger. At the conclusion of the trial, the judge allowed the press to identify Venables and Thompson. However, he also imposed injunctions that prevented the dissemination of information about the two offenders. 

When Venables and Thompson were assessed as eligible for release, they were also given new identities because of widespread public hostility to them both. There was reasonable concern that, if anything became known about these new identities, the process would be self-defeating. 

In November 2000, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, the then President of the Family Division, granted extensive injunctions. These were recorded in Venables & Thompson v News Group Newspapers Ltd & Ors.

The injunctions were issued contra mundum (against the world) and prohibited any reporting that would jeopardise the new identities. It is commonly referred to (in case law) as the Venables jurisdiction.

Another reason for extending anonymity is if revealing a person’s identity increases the risk of self-harm or suicide. Tipples J cites D & F v Persons Unknown. In that case, she considered the case of two young women who murdered Angela Wrightson. The court heard evidence there was a real risk that, should D be identified, she would self-harm. To identify F would lead to D’s identity. The judge therefore extended indefinitely the order that granted both defendants anonymity. 

When contrasted with the decision in the Markham and Edwards case, the decision in D & F demonstrates the fact-specific nature of the exercise that a judge engages in. Discharging the anonymity in order in the case of Markham and Edwards allowed full identification of those involved, and the nature of their relationships. By contrast, the court took the view in D & F that the public did not need to know the names of two vulnerable defendants.

Application of the principles

A thorough example of a judge’s reasoning when considering whether to name a defendant under 18 can be found in R v William Cornick. 

William Cornick was 15 years old when he murdered his Spanish teacher, Ann Maguire. In his judgment, Mr Justice Coulson explains that ‘there was widespread public interest in the case’ because ‘it is believed to be the first case of a pupil killing his or her teacher in a British classroom’ (§1). Coulson J considers the open justice principle and the freedom of the media to report court proceedings to be ‘inextricably linked’ (§7). 

As such, ‘a defendant in a criminal case can be expected to be named, unless there is an absolute necessity for anonymity’ (§10). In addition, it is only the child whose interests are considered in the balancing exercise. The effect on his family, ‘save for any indirect impact on William Cornick himself […] is not a relevant consideration’ (§14). The same sentiment was also repeated by Mrs Justice Yip in her judgment naming Eddie Ratcliffe and Scarlett Jenkinson, recorded as R v X & Y.

Coulson J considered whether Article 2 of the Human Rights Act, protecting the right to life, is engaged. There must be a real and immediate risk to life for this threshold to be reached. This may be a risk to life posed by others or a risk to life occurring from the potential for suicide. In this case, Coulson J did not consider that the high threshold was reached.

Ultimately, Coulson J had to consider the balance between the Article 10 rights (of the press and public) and the Article 8 rights of William Cornick. He considered that the Article 10 rights outweighed Cornick’s Article 8 rights, and accordingly lifted the §39 order. He also noted the importance of deterrence in making such an order – 

In addition, in my view, naming him has a clear deterrent effect. Deterrence is a repeated feature of the authorities referred to above, and I am in no doubt that this case is no different. Ill-informed commentators may scoff, but those of us involved in the criminal justice system know that deterrence will almost always be a factor in the naming of those involved in offences such as this. (§27)

The ongoing debate around naming under-age defendants

While there is an assumption in law that those under the age of 18 can be identified if a judge so directs, some legal commentators take the position that this should not happen. 

In 2014, the Standing Committee for Youth Justice (now the Alliance for Youth Justice) published a report that considered the naming of these defendants. It called ‘for the law to be changed, to grant automatic and lifelong anonymity to all children in trouble with the law’. 

This report challenges some of the arguments in favour of naming teenage defendants. For example, on the view that the effect on families should not be part of a judge’s consideration, they say this – 

In most cases, however, it seems that the families of both adult and child defendants are fair game. This seems against natural justice: the sibling of a child involved in family proceedings is entitled to privacy but the sibling of a child in trouble is not. It is difficult to see how this can be justified. In an article about the impact of ‘naming and shaming’56, one boy described his experiences:

“My little sister was picked on”, says Connor. His mother confirms that the eight-year-old was taunted and slapped in the playground. There has also been abuse from strangers. “One day someone shouted from a van, ‘There goes the ASBO family’,” he says.

This is not an isolated experience. Research commissioned by the Youth Justice Board found a number of similar examples, with younger siblings being picked on at school and children being called ‘ASBO boys’ in the street. 

Penelope Gibbs, commenting on the report for The Justice Gap, drew out the report’s criticism of the deterrence argument: “The public interest might be served were there any evidence of a benefit – but naming children who commit crimes does not deter others from committing crimes, and the stigma which comes with being publicly vilified is likely to turn a troubled child into a career criminal.”

In 2016, a government commissioned review recommended that child defendants be granted lifelong anonymity because automatic disclosure of their name when they reach 18 “risks undermining their rehabilitation as their identity could be established on the internet even though a conviction may have become spent for criminal records purpose” (p31, §107). 

In its response (published in December 2016), the government noted that –

It is clear that further expanding the youth reporting restrictions framework raises the significant issue of open justice, which is vital in ensuring fair trials and in maintaining the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system. We will discuss these proposals with interested parties, including the Home Office, media and youth justice interest groups in order to better understand the case for change and consider the appropriate way forward. 
(p19, §66)

The recommendation was ultimately not adopted. 

It is not just the interests of defendants that mean some people are opposed to naming under-age defendants. Dr Kathy Hampson, a senior lecturer in Criminology at Aberystwyth University, points out that a consequence of such naming is that their name and image becomes “forever associated” with their victims. The father of Brianna Ghey, Peter Spooner, disagreed with Yip J’s decision to name his daughter’s killers for this reason. He told Sky News that, 

At first, I thought they should be named. Why should they be protected? People should know who they are. Now, I think their names are always going to be tied to Brianna’s all the time […] I think they should just be forgotten about, locked up and not be spoken about again. They’re nothing.

By contrast, Brianna Ghey’s mother, Esther Ghey, did support the naming of her daughter’s killers because “when they are 18, their names will be released anyway. It’s inevitable, so they might as well get it all done in one go, the sentencing, revealing the names, and they can hopefully move forward and do something positive.”

Denise Courtney, Ann Maguire’s sister, also supported the naming of her sister’s killer, though for different reasons: “If by naming someone and putting their details out there in the media, if that prevents one other person from committing a similar crime then it’s worth the fact they are named.”

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) will sometimes actively support the media’s application for an order to be lifted. On other occasions the CPS remains neutral, as was the case in R v X & Y and in the case of Markham and Edwards. The CPS’s position on the application to name Harvey Willgoose’s killer is not currently clear. 

It is also worth pointing out that there is a diversity of view amongst media organisations who have applied for reporting restrictions to be discharged. For example, after The Guardian successfully applied to name William Cornick, Chris Elliott (at the time, The Guardian’s readers’ editor) expressed some disquiet at the decision – 

Whatever the legal arguments, the Guardian has to be sure that its decision to go to court to have the boy named is consistent with the values it espouses and for which it is often criticised, not least when it puts its faith in the capacity for rehabilitation. The next time we are faced with a choice, I hope we take a longer, harder look at the options. 

It is beyond dispute that Ellenbogen J has the legal power to decide whether the killer of Harvey Willgoose should be granted continued anonymity. The question for policymakers is whether the courts should have such power. 

Audio-visual resources

For further insight into the debates, the following audio-visual resources may be useful –  

Ep42: Are our courts fit for child defendants? (hyperlinked – Transform Justice)

Ep 12: Naming the Killers; The Trial – Brianna Ghey (hyperlinked – The Daily Mail)

The Judges: Power, Politics and the People – Episode 7 – Baroness Butler-Sloss (hyperlinked – The University of Law via YouTube. Baroness Butler-Sloss discusses her decision in relation to Jon Venables and Robert Thompson at 19:50-20:20). 

Teens jailed for luring Brianna Ghey to park and killing her in knife attack (hyperlinked – Sky News via YouTube. These are the sentencing remarks of Mrs Justice Yip)

Jon Venables’ Ex-Lawyer Comments on the Calls to Remove His Anonymity | Good Morning Britain (hyperlinked – YouTube. This is a discussion about whether Jon Venables’s anonymity should be maintained following a further sentence of imprisonment) 

Anonymity Seminar (hyperlinked – Doughty Street Chambers via YouTube)